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CIVIL PROCEDURE-CLASS ACTIONS-TRIAL COURTS HAVE
BROAD DISCRETION TO CERTIFY CLASSES. International Union of
Electric Radio and Machine Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747
S.W.2d 81 (1988).
On October 7, 8, and 9, 1985, members of the International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (Union) went on
strike at the Sanyo plant in Forrest City, Arkansas. The company
planned to continue minimal production so that any salaried or
hourly employee would have work to do. However, before the night
shift on October 7 the Sanyo Company closed the plant because of the
risk to employees created by the crowd of picketers.
Seven Sanyo employees brought an action against the Union,
their Local 1106, and some named union members. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant Union was responsible for striking picketers
who prevented them from entering the Sanyo plant to work. The
plaintiffs claimed loss of pay on days when the plant was closed due to
the strike. Some of the plaintiffs claimed damages for personal inju-
ries and property damage sustained when they crossed or attempted
to cross the picket line.
The plaintiffs' complaint asserted that they were bringing their
action on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated
and requested that the trial court certify it as a class action. The St.
Francis Circuit Court held a hearing in response to that request, at
which the plaintiffs presented affidavits of thirty-four employees who
suffered property damage. The plaintiffs also presented petitions of
thirty-five employees who alleged that they "had been affected by the
conduct of the defendants in such a manner as to qualify them as a
member of the class described in the complaint."'
After the hearing, the trial judge certified the action as a class
action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial judge described two classes:
(1) All salaried and nonunion hourly employees who the defend-
ants allegedly deprived of the right to work at Sanyo Manufactur-
ing Corporation on October 7, 8 and 9, 1985, because of the plant
closing.
(2) All salaried and nonunion hourly employees receiving motor
1. International Union of Electric, Radio and Machine Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 110, 747 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1988).
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vehicle and/or personal damages when crossing or attempting to
cross the picket line during the Sanyo strike on October 7, 8 and 9,
1985.2
The Union appealed from the order certifying the class action,
asserting four arguments: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in
certifying the class action; (2) the number of persons seeking relief
was too small to meet the requirements of Rule 23;3 (3) there were not
predominant common questions of law or fact as required by the rule;
and (4) the court should not allow a tort action to proceed as a class
action. The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed and rejected each of
these arguments and held that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in certifying the case as a class action. International Union of
Electric, Radio and Machine Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747
S.W.2d 81 (1988).
The forerunner of the modem class action was a procedure
known as the bill of peace.' The English Chancery Courts used the
bill as early as the 17th century to facilitate settling disputes involving
common questions and multiple parties in a single action.6 Because
the bill of peace7 originated in the English Chancery Courts, class
suits in the United States were originally brought only in courts of
equity.' The fusion of law and equity in the federal courts in 1983
made equity class action procedure applicable to actions at law. 9
Since its development, the class action has been one of the most
controversial procedural devices.' 0 Commentators and judges have
described it as everything from "one of the most socially useful reme-
2. Id. at 109, 747 S.W.2d at 82.
3. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. 295 Ark. at 109, 747 S.W.2d at 82.
5. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1751 (1986).
6. Homberger, State Class Actions And The Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 611
(1971).
7. In English law the usual and orderly method of beginning an equitable action was by
filing a bill. This was an original statement of the plaintiff's cause of action. Under State and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the bill has been replaced by the complaint. 2 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 339-40 (4th ed. 1936).
Specifically, bills of peace were developed in chancery to decide common questions in a
single action where there were multiple parties. Joinder of all interested parties was required
under the bill of peace. Comment, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 928 (1958).
8. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, at § 1751.
9. Id.
10. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (4th ed. 1983).
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dies in history""1 to a "Frankenstein monster." 12 The justifications
for bringing class suits13 and the basic philosophy of class actions
have remained the same throughout the centuries. In his law review
article, Professor Adolf Homburger describes the philosophy of class
suits:
Self-interest, the motivating force that sparks the adversary
system, also sustains the doctrine of class actions. We may trust
man to help his fellow man if by doing so he helps himself-partic-
ularly if only by helping others will he be able to protect and pro-
mote his own interests. Building on that simple premise, the
device provides for the use of man's natural instinct to act in his
own best interest in order to achieve justice and procedural effi-
ciency in mass litigation.14
The Arkansas legal system incorporated the class action when
the General Assembly adopted its civil code in 1869.15 The code was
substantially similar to one then in use in Kentucky, 16 which, in turn,
was a direct descendant of the New York Field Code.17 The code
simplified and liberalized the rules of the complex common law sys-
tem of pleading.' 8
The language of the civil code's class action provision was re-
tained when Arkansas adopted the Arkansas Statutes Annotated in
1947.19 However, Arkansas' original class action statute was
11. Id. (quoting Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970)).
12. The term was used first by Chief Judge Lombard in his dissenting opinion in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968).
13. The justifications traditionally offered concern disputes which involve a common or
general interest or many persons or when the class is so numerous that it would be impractica-
ble to bring all members before the court. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra
note 5, at § 1751.
14. Homburger, supra note 6, at 609-10.
15. ARKANSAS CODE § 33 (1869). The code section read as follows:
Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or where
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring all before the court within a
reasonable time, one or more may sue, or defend for the benefit of all.
16. See generally Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1952); Cox
& Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came in From the Code, 33 ARK. L. REV. 1
(1979); Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1971);
Spears, Comment: The 1979 Civil Procedure Rules, 2 UALR L.J. 89 (1979).
17. Barnhart, supra note 16 at 13-14. "Code pleading" began with the enactment of a
code of procedure in New York in 1848. The New York Code was largely attributable to the
work of David Dudley Field, a member of the New York bar. Hence, it is generally referred to
as the "Field Code."
18. Id. at 14.
19. Act of Mar. 26, 1941, No. 334, § 2, 1941 Ark. Acts 868 (codified as ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-809 (1947)).
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superceded when the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1978.20
The first Arkansas case recognizing what amounted to a class
action was St. Louis, IM. & S. Ry. Co. v. Cumbie,2 ' decided in 1911.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that where a contract of shipment
was made by the plaintiff as agent for several shippers, the plaintiff
could bring suit on behalf of the principals.22 Cumbie was an action
at law for damages, but later Arkansas cases held that class actions
could be maintained only in courts of equity.23 It was not until 1968,
in Thomas v. Dean,24 that the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
class actions could be brought at law.
Thomas removed one obstacle to class actions, but two other bar-
riers have continued to plague would-be Arkansas class action liti-
gants in modem cases: (1) the requirement that a party seeking class
certification show common questions of law and fact; and (2) the re-
fusal of courts to certify class actions where a potential existed for
splintering the action into individual claims or defenses as the litiga-
tion progressed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court imposed the "and fact" require-
ment in Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc. 25 Construing Arkansas'
original class action statute,26 the court held that a party seeking class
action certification had to show that there were "common questions
of law and fact"27 applicable to all class members.2  The requirement
20. Re: Rules of Civil Procedure, 264 Ark. 964 (1978) (per curiam). The rules took effect
July 1, 1979. ARK. R. Civ. P. 86.
21. 101 Ark. 172, 141 S.W. 939 (1911).
22. Id. at 179, 141 S.W. at 941.
23. Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921). Baskins held
that class actions, which were seen as being based in the equitable doctrine of virtual represen-
tation, could not be brought at law. Id. The doctrine of virtual representation was "an excep-
tion to the rule that all persons having an interest in the subject matter of an equity suit must
be made parties." ANN. CAS. 1913 C at 654.
24. 245 Ark. 446, 432 S.W.2d 771 (1968).
25. 258 Ark. 925, 529 S.W.2d 876 (1975). In Ross a purchaser of two lots in a subdivision
brought a class action against a real estate development company alleging that installment
contracts were usurious and violated the Truth in Lending Act. The court held that the pur-
chaser did not have commonality of questions of law and fact with other purchasers of lots
involving 833 separate transactions and negotiations.
26. Act of Mar. 26, 1941, No. 334, § 2, 1941 Ark. Acts 868 (codified as ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-809 (1947)).
27. 258 Ark. at 930, 529 S.W.2d at 880 (emphasis added).
28. Practical considerations also contributed to the court's reluctance to certify the case as
a class action. The court mentioned the considerable time and expense involved if it allowed
the case to proceed as a class action-the limited chancery court staff would have to take care
of the necessary proceedings, answer the inquiries for further information of the sales contract
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that classes have common questions of law and fact limited class ac-
tion cases to those where all members of the class have a common
injury or a legal interest in the very same item or relationship in dis-
pute. Few cases satisfied the requirement of common questions of law
and fact. The law and fact requirement rendered class actions of little
practical utility, since, in cases meeting this test, the plaintiffs almost
invariably could be joined under section thirty of the civil code.29
When the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1978, Arkansas Rule 23 superceded the original
class action statute.3" Rule 23(b), in effect, overruled the holding in
Ross by providing that a class action may be maintained if the court
finds that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.3
After the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the law/
fact dilemma, Arkansas courts found another barrier to class action
certification. In both Drew v. First Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion32 and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim,33 the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed a class certification based upon the possibility that the
plaintiffs' claims would present varied defenses that would require
separate trials. In each case the court feared this "splintering" would
make the actions both unmanageable by the court and unfair to the
defendants.34
In Drew, the plaintiffs challenged an assumption fee charged by
First Federal on a mortgage and sought to have the case certified as a
class action.35 In denying class certification, the Arkansas Supreme
Court expressed concern that First Federal might have different de-
fenses with respect to each assumption which should be raised indi-
vidually.36 Class actions, said the court, must not only be efficient but
fair, both to the class and the defendant. 37 Because the plaintiffs did
transactions of the 833 class members and keep those members advised as to the status of the
case. 258 Ark. at 930, 529 S.W.2d at 880.
29. ARKANSAS CODE § 30 (1869). Section 30 provided: "All persons having an interest
in the subject of an action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs,
except where it is otherwise provided in this Code." This section was supplanted by ARK. R.
Civ. P. 20, which currently governs permissive joinder procedure.
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1947).
31. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (emphasis added).
32. 271 Ark. 667, 610 S.W.2d 876 (1981).
33. 287 Ark. 78, 696 S.W.2d 732 (1985).
34. Drew, 271 Ark. at 669, 610 S.W.2d at 878; Nesheim, 287 Ark. at 81, 696 S.W.2d at
735.
35. 271 Ark. at 668, 610 S.W.2d at 876.
36. Id. at 671, 610 S.W.2d at 878.
37. Id.
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not show that a class action would be superior to individual remedies
for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, the court held
class action certification to be inappropriate.3"
The court reached a similar result in Nesheim, holding that com-
mon questions did not predominate over individual ones. 39 The suit,
which the Pulaski County Chancery Court had certified as a class
action, involved allegations of usury in connection with automobile
sales contracts.' On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court compared
the case to Drew,4 noting the potential for varied defenses against the
class members.4 2 The court concluded that if certified as a class ac-
tion, the case would splinter into many individual suits thereby creat-
ing problems of manageability.4 3 In reversing the chancery court's
class action certification, the court mentioned that, unlike the federal
courts, it does not resolve doubts in favor of class actions."
In 1988, a turning point45 in the Arkansas courts' stance of disfa-
voring class actions occurred in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Mor-
ris.46 In Morris the problems of "splintering" and manageability that
the court articulated in Drew47 and Nesheim " were directly addressed
and eliminated as a barrier to the certification of class actions.49 Mor-
ris involved a class of plaintiffs who had granted "fixed price" mineral
38. Id. at 670, 610 S.W.2d at 878.
39. 287 Ark. at 82, 696 S.W.2d at 734. In a predecessor case to Neshiem, the Arkansas
Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition which would have prevented a chancellor from
trying a suit as a class action. The basis for the petition was that Arkansas Rule 23 violates
due process because, unlike its federal counterpart, it does not require that notice be given to
individual class members. The court held the petitioner, who was one of the defendants, had
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the rule. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Rogers,
285 Ark. 64, 685 S.W.2d 145 (1985). The order certifying the class action was appealed in
Nesheim.
40. 287 Ark. at 79-80, 696 S.W.2d at 733-34.
41. 271 Ark. 667, 610 S.W.2d 876 (1981).
42. 287 Ark. at 82, 696 S.W.2d at 735.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 83, 696 S.W.2d at 736.
45. One prior case that might have appeared to be a deviation from the Arkansas courts'
traditional reluctance to certify class actions was Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Sarver, 288
Ark. 6, 701 S.W.2d 364 (1986). The action was brought by property owners and realtors
challenging the validity of a gatehouse lease. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld class certi-
fication; however, the court did not reach beyond its traditional rigid policy against class ac-
tions. In Cooper, the court could easily find a commonality of interest (the class members'
legal interest in the gatehouse lease) that would have satisfied the requirement of law and fact
set forth in Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 529 S.W.2d 876 (1975), under
the original class action statute.
46. 294 Ark. 496, 744 S.W.2d 709 (1988).
47. 271 Ark. 667, 610 S.W.2d 876 (1981).
48. 287 Ark. 78, 696 S.W.2d 732 (1985).
49. 294 Ark. at 499, 744 S.W.2d at 710.
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leases to Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company.50 The Arkansas
Supreme Court found a common question of fact regarding the ac-
tion, although there were also questions affecting only individual
members."1 It held there was no requirement that the facts as to each
individual be identical to those pertaining to all members of the
class.52 Further, the court indicated that if the evidence raises ques-
tions affecting individual members only, those questions could be de-
ferred until questions common to the class had been resolved. 53 By
discounting the significance of "splintering," Morris initiated a course
toward the liberalization of Arkansas class action certification.54
With Rule 23 having eliminated the "and fact" obstacle5 and
Morris having minimized the concern over the "splintering" prob-
lem,56 the stage was set for International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers v. Hudson, 7 where the Arkansas Supreme
Court, in affirming certification of a class,58 significantly liberalized
Arkansas class action law. The class in Hudson consisted of employ-
ees who brought suit alleging that the defendant unions were respon-
sible for personal injuries and property damage sustained by class
members as they attempted to cross picket lines.59 The court consid-
ered and rejected several arguments against class action certification
under Arkansas Rule 23, concluding that Arkansas Rule 23 should be
interpreted in the liberal spirit of Federal Rule 236o and that trial
judges have broad discretion in determining whether to allow a case
to proceed as a class action.61
The Hudson court discussed its holding in Drew62 regarding the
management of class actions when there is a potential for "splinter-
ing" into separate cases because of individual claims within the
class.6 3 It acknowledged the unfairness in requiring a defendant to
present his defenses to the claims of some, but not all of the plaintiff
50. Id. at 497, 744 S.W.2d at 709.
51. Id. at 499, 744 S.W.2d at 710.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. In concurrence, Justice Hickman took the position that Morris overruled Nesheim.
Id. at 500, 744 S.W.2d at 711 (Hickman, J., concurring).
55. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
57. 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
58. Id. at 121, 747 S.W.2d at 89.
59. Id. at 109, 747 S.W.2d at 82.
60. Id. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
61. Id. at 117, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
62. 271 Ark. 667, 610 S.W.2d 876 (1981).
63. 295 Ark. at 117, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
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class.6' Therefore, the court held that it would be improper if the
unions in Hudson could not present all their defenses to the individual
claims of the plaintiffs.65 However, the court said that if there is a
question common to all, the trial court can achieve real efficiency by
considering it as a class action.66 If the common question is answered
in the negative, then the case is over except for the claims against the
named individual defendants. 67 If the question is answered affirma-
tively, there will be "splintered" cases to try, but efficiency will still
have been advanced by deciding the common question in one action.68
The court concluded this procedure would not be unfair to the
defendant unions because they would be able to defend fully on the
basic liability claim.69 Moreover, if their liability is established in the
first phase of the trial, the unions will have the opportunity to present
individual defenses to the claims of individual class members.7°
Related to the issues of class action management and the
splintering of individual claims,71 the defendant unions argued that if
the court was to comply with its holding in Nesheim,72 which had the
same type of predominant common question as Hudson, it would
have to reverse the trial court's order.73
In Nesheim the court reversed a class certification order, holding
that common questions did not predominate over individual claims
and noting that, if certified, the case would splinter into many individ-
ual ones.74 The Hudson court agreed with the union's argument and
overruled Nesheim to the extent that the case was inconsistent with its
holding in Hudson.75 The court then repeated its position that once
the predominant issue is resolved, the class will have to be decertified
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 117, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In conjunction with this, the defendant unions raised the issue that tort claims that are
not "disaster" cases, where one event is responsible for injuries to a class of persons, should not
be permitted to proceed as a class action. The union pointed out that the events in Hudson
occurred over a three day period, and thus, were unlike the mass disaster cases where a cata-
clysmic event inflicts similar harm on a group of people. Disagreeing with that argument, the
court referenced specific cases in which other jurisdictions have permitted tort class actions
where the wrong alleged was not a disaster case, it occurred over a period longer than three
days, and involved separate damage claims. Id. at 120, 747 S.W.2d at 88.
72. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
73. 295 Ark. at 119, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
74. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 81, 696 S.w.2d 732, 734 (1985).
75. 295 Ark. at 119, 747 S.W.2d at 88.
[Vol. 11:391
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and the individual claims allowed to proceed.
7 6
The court also considered that each class member's claims were
too small to permit pursuing them individually." It mentioned that
the sole fact that the claims are small is not a reason to permit a class
action; 8 however, it is a factor other courts have considered in deter-
mining whether the class action is superior to other forms of relief.
79
The court ultimately determined that a class action, in this particular
case, was superior to other forms of relief.8"
The Hudson court also considered the issue of numerosity.8 1
Numerosity occurs "where the parties are numerous, and it is imprac-
ticable to bring all before the court within a reasonable time, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."82 The defendant un-
ions in Hudson contended that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the re-
quirement of numerosity1 3 The court held that the class was not
limited or defined by the thirty-five persons who filed affidavits indi-
cating a desire to be a class member.84 The court noted that seventy-
three property damage estimates were made. 5 Further, with respect
to the wage loss subclass, testimony revealed that the Sanyo plant was
closed for two days and that hourly employees were paid only for the
time they worked. 86 Thus, the court defined the class as nonstrikers
who suffered property damage and those who lost work time and pay
during the strike.8 7 Therefore the class would include at least several
hundred employees. 8 Although it did not define an acceptable
number of class members that would meet the numerosity require-
ment,8 9 the court stated that there was a question of common or gen-
76. Id. at 120, 747 S.W.2d at 88.
77. Id. at 118, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
78. Contrary to the discretion given state courts of whether to consider the size of the
plaintiff's claims, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), set forth the require-
ment that each plaintiff must meet the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement in federal
diversity actions. Id. at 301.
79. 295 Ark. at 118, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
83. 295 Ark. at 118, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
84. Id. at 118-119, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
85. Id. at 119, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Hudson did not define an exact number of class
members that would fulfill the numerosity requirements of Rule 23(a). However, the court did
mention that in City of North Little Rock v. Vogelsang, 273 Ark. 390, 619 S.W.2d 652 (1981),
it had held seventeen not to be a sufficient number, whereas in Cooper Communities, Inc. v.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
eral interest to "many persons." 90 No Arkansas court has articulated
a specific number of plaintiffs sufficient to meet the requirement of
numerosity under Rule 23(a).9 '
The court in Hudson compared and contrasted Federal Rule 2392
to Arkansas Rule 23. 9 3 The court stated "[w]hile it is true that sub-
section (a) of our rule differs from that of the federal rule, the differ-
ence is one of language only." 94 Justice Newbern, who wrote the
Hudson opinion, previously stated in a law review article that the Ar-
kansas rule is basically a repetition of Federal Rule 23(a), but is con-
densed. 95 The court noted that both Federal Rule 23(a) and Arkansas
Rule 23(a) address the same basic requirements to class actions.96
While the court noted similarities between the federal and Ar-
kansas rules,97 it also noted that differences exist.9 Significantly,
early in its opinion,99 the court specifically referred to the absence of a
notice provision in Arkansas Rule 23 which Federal Rule 2 3i °° em-
bodies. The absence of such a provision raises questions regarding the
constitutionality of Arkansas Rule 23.1" 1 Though not mentioned by
the court, Federal Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) authorize specific class
action suits whereas Arkansas Rule 23 does not.0 2 Despite these dif-
Sarver, 288 Ark. 6, 701 S.W.2d 364 (1986), 184 were found to be enough. 295 Ark. at 118, 747
S.W.2d at 87.
90. 295 Ark. at 119, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
91. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(a) lists numerosity as a prerequisite to a class action.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
93. 295 Ark. at 115-16, 747 S.W.2d at 85-86.
94. Id. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
95. Cox & Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came in from the Code, 33
ARK. L. REV. 1 (1979).
96. 295 Ark. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
97. Id.
98. Id. When asked why Arkansas Rule 23 was not copied verbatim from Federal Rule
23, Walter Cox, an attorney in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and reporter to the Arkansas Supreme
Court Committee on Rules of Procedure in Civil Cases, replied that one reason why the com-
mittee changed the language was to streamline and condense the rule because the members felt
the federal rule was stated in a cumbersome way. He explained that their intention was not to
change or deviate from the meaning of the federal rule or to change prior law. Telephone
interview with Walter Cox, Attorney-at-Law, Davis, Cox and Wright, Fayetteville, Arkansas,
and Reporter and Project Director, Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure in Civil Cases (June 27, 1988). Reporter's Notes (as modified by the Court) to Rule 23:
Class Actions in Arkansas have been governed by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1962) which
provided minimum procedural rules. This rule does not change prior law.
99. 295 Ark. at 112, 747 S.W.2d at 84.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
101. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Rogers, 285 Ark. 64, 685 S.W.2d 145 (1985) (holding
that the petitioner had no standing to question the constitutionality of Rule 23's failure to
require notice to class members on behalf of the potential class members).
102. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(2) with ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.
[Vol. 11:391
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ferences, the intent of Arkansas Rule 23 was to maintain the same
meaning as the federal rule. 11 3 The court reasoned that the omitted
portions of the federal rule do not affect the question of whether class
actions should be favored.'l° The court then indicated that Arkansas
Rule 23 should be applied as liberally as Federal Rule 23, stating: "It
seems apparent that the spirit of the federal rule is to be found in our
Rule 23 even if all the words are not. Our attempts to cling to our
prerule tradition may have been inconsistent with the rule."'0 5
Ultimately it will be left to the trial courts to determine how lib-
erally Arkansas Rule 23 will be interpreted in individual cases. This
is because the theme of the opinion in Hudson is that trial judges have
broad discretion to certify an action as a class action. 106 The court
noted that beginning with Drew'1 7 and through Morris,'08 it has rec-
ognized the broad discretion of the trial judge as extending not only to
protection of the absent class members"0 9 but also to the question of
whether the class action should proceed." 0
Hudson is significant for several reasons. First, Hudson shows
that the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted a more liberal stance
toward class actions, confirming that Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v.
MorrisI1 ' was not an aberration. Prior to Morris the court discour-
aged class action certification in cases where the potential existed for
individual claims or defenses to arise." 12 Morris suggested that indi-
vidual questions could be deferred until questions common to the
class were decided. Hudson was more explicit on this point, stating
that, so long as there is a common question of law or fact, the trial
court could certify the action as a class action for trial of the common
question, then try the individual issues separately. 1 3 By approving
certification of cases which may involve individual questions of law or
fact, the court made a much broader range of cases susceptible to
class action treatment.
103. See supra note 98.
104. 295 Ark. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
105. 295 Ark. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
106. The court mentioned the discretion afforded to trial courts six times.
107. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
109. The court was articulating a position expressed in the Reporter's Notes (as modified
by the court) to Rule 23. Rule 23 confers broad discretion upon the trial court to dictate such
terms as are necessary to protect the rights of absent class members. This discretion is also
conferred upon the federal courts by FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
110. 295 Ark. at 117, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
111. 294 Ark. 496, 744 S.W.2d 709 (1988).
112. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
113. 295 Ark. at 117, 120, 747 S.W.2d at 87, 88.
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This method of handling class actions is instrumental to imple-
menting the central premise of Hudson-that trial courts have broad
discretion to certify a class action. Though the thrust of Hudson was
to liberalize class actions, the court made it clear that this discretion
cuts both ways. The court said the trial judge in Hudson could have
refused to certify the action as a class action and it "might well" have
upheld him in that exercise of his broad discretion." 4 Because the
United States Supreme Court has placed severe limitations on the
availability of federal class actions by requiring that each member of
the class meet the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement," 5 the
ability to bring a class action in a state court is of great importance,
especially where the plaintiffs' claims are too small to pursue individu-
ally. Although the court agreed with the defendant union that the
sole fact that the claims are small is not a reason to permit a class
action, the Hudson opinion supported the propriety of considering
those small claims when a court determines whether a class action is
superior to other forms of relief.1"6 Therefore, Hudson is important
because it has opened the doors for state class actions where the fed-
eral courts are gradually closing theirs.
In addition, the court in Hudson indicated that Federal Rule 23
and Arkansas Rule 23 were very similar in meaning." 7 This similar-
ity presents an opportunity for attorneys to argue more persuasively
that cases interpreting Federal Rule 23 are relevant authority in
resolving class action issues were no Arkansas authority exists.
Finally, while the court was not required to discuss the constitu-
tionality of the lack of a notice requirement in Arkansas Rule 23, it
did mention that there may be problems with it."' Under Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust," 9 sufficient notice is required to give
absent class members an opportunity to participate in or challenge a
suit.1 20 Mullane held that, for the class involved in the controversy, a
published "legal notice" was not adequate. 2  The United States
114. Id. at 121, 747 S.W.2d at 88-89.
115. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
116. 295 Ark. at 118, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
117. Id. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
118. Id. at 112, 747 S.W.2d at 84.
119. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane dealt with the constitutional sufficiency of notice to
beneficiaries of judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund.
120. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court held that in
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action it is mandatory that individual notice must be provided to those
members of the class who are identifiable through reasonable effort. Notice by publication is
not permissible even where the cost of individual notice is prohibitively high. Id. at 173-77.
121. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319-20.
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Supreme Court in Mullane said:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as rea-
sonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance
122
Therefore, the lack of a notice provision may portend future due pro-
cess problems for the Arkansas class action rule.
The court's decision in Hudson liberalized case treatment under
Arkansas Rule 23 by granting trial judges broad discretion to certify a
class action. The certification requirements for class actions under
the Arkansas rule are similar to those under the federal rule. 123 How-
ever, the necessity that each class member meet the $10,000 amount
in controversy requirement in federal diversity cases 124 and the need
for individual notice under the federal rule 125 make the Arkansas state
courts a more attractive forum for class actions involving small claims
and numerous class members. Of course, tactical or other considera-
tions1 26 may dictate an attorney's choice of whether to bring a class
action in a state or federal court. In choosing which courthouse to
enter, attorneys should consider the implicit invitation extended in
Hudson to file in state court.
Sarah Wilson
122. Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
123. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
126. 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 13.02, 13.03 (1985). In choosing
a state or federal forum there are several factors to consider. Judges on the federal bench are
more experienced with class actions and there is more case precedent because Federal Rule 23
has been in existence longer than its state counterparts. Federal courts offer wider jurisdiction
and venue and broader service of process. Attorney's fees are often expressly provided for in
federal laws. However, there are also advantages to suing in state court. Cases in which state
or local issues are primary or where local opinion is supportive may be better filed in state
court. State courts are not as likely to dismiss cases for venue reasons when a suit is brought in
the state of incorporation.

